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Abstract
Background: Some patients awaken from coma (that is, open the eyes) but remain unresponsive (that is, only
showing reflex movements without response to command). This syndrome has been coined vegetative state. We
here present a new name for this challenging neurological condition: unresponsive wakefulness syndrome
(abbreviated UWS).
Discussion: Many clinicians feel uncomfortable when referring to patients as vegetative. Indeed, to most of the lay
public and media vegetative state has a pejorative connotation and seems inappropriately to refer to these patients
as being vegetable-like. Some political and religious groups have hence felt the need to emphasize these
vulnerable patients’ rights as human beings. Moreover, since its first description over 35 years ago, an increasing
number of functional neuroimaging and cognitive evoked potential studies have shown that physicians should be
cautious to make strong claims about awareness in some patients without behavioral responses to command.
Given these concerns regarding the negative associations intrinsic to the term vegetative state as well as the
diagnostic errors and their potential effect on the treatment and care for these patients (who sometimes never
recover behavioral signs of consciousness but often recover to what was recently coined a minimally conscious
state) we here propose to replace the name.
Conclusion: Since after 35 years the medical community has been unsuccessful in changing the pejorative image
associated with the words vegetative state, we think it would be better to change the term itself. We here offer
physicians the possibility to refer to this condition as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome or UWS. As this neutral
descriptive term indicates, it refers to patients showing a number of clinical signs (hence syndrome) of
unresponsiveness (that is, without response to commands) in the presence of wakefulness (that is, eye opening).
Background
We here present a new name (unresponsive wakefulness
syndrome or UWS) for an over 35-year-old syndrome
with an unintended albeit persistent negative connota-
tion: the vegetative state. The widespread use of intensive
care medicine and artificial ventilation to sustain respira-
tion and circulation has increased survival from coma. It
has also led to an increasing number of patients who
have awakened from coma (that is, showed eye opening,
incompatible with the diagnosis of coma) yet remain
unresponsive (that is, only showed reflex movements as
is also the case for coma) [1]. In Europe, this clinical syn-
drome was initially termed apallic syndrome [2] and
coma vigil [3] but it is currently known in the medical
community as persistent vegetative state (PVS), a term
first coined by Jennet and Plum in 1972 in their mile-
stone Lancet paper [4]. The name vegetative state was
chosen to refer to the preserved vegetative nervous func-
tioning, meaning these patients have (variably) preserved
sleep-wake cycles, respiration, digestion or thermoregula-
tion. The term persistent was added to denote that the
condition remained for at least one month after insult. In
1994, the Multi-Society Task Force on PVS defined the
temporal criteria for irreversibility (that is, more than one
year for traumatic and three months for non-traumatic
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(anoxic) etiology) and introduced the notion of perma-
nent vegetative state [5]. It is to these latter cases that
ethical and legal end-of-life issues, of withholding and
withdrawal of life sustaining treatment (that is, artificial
hydration and nutrition), are related [6,7].
Over the last three decades, a growing number of phy-
sicians and healthcare workers have felt uncomfortable
when referring to patients as vegetative [8-10], resulting
in a number of papers reiterating the intellectual justifi-
cation of the origins and choice of the term [11]. The
conception of a vegetative nervous system goes back to
1800 when Bichat divided the nervous system into ani-
malic and vegetative [12]. The former linked the person
to her or his environment and was expressed by the mus-
cles of voluntary locomotion and the organs of external
senses. The latter identified the nutritional functions of
the body. According to the Oxford English dictionary, ‘to
vegetate’ is to ‘live a merely physical life devoid of intel-
lectual activity or social intercourse’ and ‘vegetative’
describes ‘an organic body capable of growth and devel-
opment but devoid of sensation and thought’. To part, if
not most, of the lay public and media, however, it has a
rather pejorative undertone and seems (incorrectly) to
refer to patients as being vegetable-like (for example, an
internet search with the terms vegetative state and vege-
table returned 26,700 hits, état végétatif and plante
19,600; stato vegetativo and vegetale 49,100 (Google
search performed 8 April 2010). Many authors and social,
political and religious groups have hence felt the need to
emphasize these patients’ clearly evident rights to be fully
regarded as human beings [13,14].
In addition to this malaise regarding the chosen term
and its unintended denigrating connotation, some feel
that referring to these patients as being in a state may
(incorrectly) denote chronicity. Despite the fact that the
clinical criteria of the vegetative state do not imply a tem-
poral dimension, referring only to a clinical tableau
reflecting wakeful unawareness [4], for many physicians
and healthcare workers it has the negative connotation of
a being a longstanding and nearly irreversible condition.
The introduction of the term persistent vegetative state
(too often confounded with permanent vegetative state
with which it unfortunately shares the same abbreviation
PVS), may have contributed to this [15]. In contrast to
coma (which is an acute and transitory condition, lasting
no more than days or weeks), a vegetative state may
become chronic (lasting for decades) or may remain a
transitory condition on the way to further recovery [16].
This recently led the Aspen Neurobehavioral Conference
Workgroup to characterize a new clinical entity coined
the ‘minimally conscious state’ (MCS), describing
patients who have recovered from a vegetative state
(meaning they show more than reflex motor behavior but
fail to show functional communication or object use)
[17]. Despite clear evidence that vegetative patients are
not uniformly hopeless [18,19], once stamped with the
diagnosis VS, clinical practice shows it often is difficult to
change the label, and the first signs of recovery of con-
sciousness are too often missed. Previous studies by
Childs et al. in Texas [20] and Andrews et al. in London
[21] have estimated misdiagnosis of chronic patients
referred to rehabilitation centers to be at around 40%. It
has been argued that these older studies, performed prior
to the publication of the Multi-Society Task Force on
PVS criteria [5] of VS, and long before the criteria of the
MCS [17], were overly pessimistic. A very recent study,
however, confirmed this unacceptably high rate of diag-
nostic error [22]. A number of highly publicised patients
also illustrate this point. Julia Tavalaro survived a brain
trauma and was transferred to a tertiary care centre
where she was called “the vegetable” for over six years,
although she was conscious and sensate. She later wrote
her memoirs in Look Up for Yes [23]. Terry Wallis, who
was considered to be in a VS, made the headlines when
he started to speak 19 years after his car accident. Careful
analysis of his medical records quickly showed he actually
recovered to a MCS within the first year after his brain
trauma [24]. Finally, since the term VS was coined in
1972, an increasing number of functional neuroimaging
and event related potential (ERP) studies have shown
that physicians should be very careful about making
strong claims about patients’ awareness [25-31]. This
situation is further complicated when patients with such
disorders of consciousness have underlying deficits in the
domain of verbal or non-verbal communication func-
tions, such as aphasia, agnosia or apraxia [32,33].
Discussion
Given these concerns regarding the negative connotation
inherent in the term vegetative state and its possible
effect on vulnerable patients awakening from coma, who
sometimes never recover any voluntary responsiveness
but may (probably more often than initially believed)
recover minimal signs of consciousness, we here propose
to change the label vegetative state, thus hoping to make
it easier to change their management and standards of
care. The European Task Force on Disorders of Con-
sciousness has passed a proposal to change the name to
unresponsive wakefulness syndrome or UWS. If after 35
years the medical community has been unsuccessful in
changing the pejorative image associated with the words
vegetative state, we propose that it might be better to
change the term itself. From now on, physicians can
choose this neutral descriptive term to refer to patients
who, as the name indicates, show a number of clinical
signs (hence the use of syndrome) of unresponsiveness
(meaning they fail to show non-reflex behavior or com-
mand following) in the presence of wakefulness (meaning
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they open their eyes spontaneously or upon stimulation).
Given the above mentioned difficulty in making strong
general claims about awareness in severely brain
damaged patients, we have chosen here to use the clini-
cally descriptive term unresponsive rather than the mis-
leading unaware. After discussion, other (existing)
alternatives [34] were rejected. Coma vigil was discarded
because the term is a contradiction in terminis, given
that coma patients by definition never open their eyes.
Apallic syndrome was also rejected, as recent evidence
has shown that these patients are not a-pallic (meaning
without a cortex or pallium) [35], but classically show
preserved albeit disconnected islands of residual (merely
primary) cortical functioning [36].
Next, we stress the need for prospective studies on
prognosis [18,37,38] and treatment [39,40] in large,
well-described cohorts of patients with disorders of con-
sciousness, permitting evidence-based decision-making
while respecting individual divergence in the challenging
issues related to end-of-life decisions [6,7]. Such studies
will need standardized behavioral assessment and out-
come scales [41]. The worldwide acceptance of the Glas-
gow Coma Scale (GCS) [42] has standardized patient
assessment in the ICU and allowed proper research to
be carried out in the field of coma. However, the GCS
was not intended to be used on patients with post-
comatose disorders of consciousness, such as UWS and
MCS. Other standardized scales will need to be
employed in these cases [43,44]. We also need reliable
objective para-clinical markers confirming our clinical
signs of motor unresponsiveness and behavior indicative
of the absence of awareness of environment and self
[45]. Studies assessing the efficacy of treatment of
patients with disorders of consciousness should be sepa-
rated into symptomatic and curative and should take
into account not only patient age, etiology and time
since insult, but also the need to clearly separate UWS
from MCS [46].
Conclusion
In conclusion, our proposal offers the medical commu-
nity the possibility to adopt a neutral and descriptive
name, unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, as an alterna-
tive to vegetative state (or apallic syndrome) which we
view as outdated. We feel this is a real necessity, given
that the term PVS continues to have strong negative con-
notations after over 35 years of use, while inadvertently
risking comparisons between patients and vegetables and
implying persistency from the moment of diagnosis. It
should be stressed that UWS is a clinical syndrome
describing patients who fail to show voluntary motor
responsiveness in the presence of eyes-open wakefulness
which can be either transitory on the way to recovery
from (minimal) consciousness or irreversible.
Abbreviations
ERP: event related potential; GCS: Glasgow Coma Scale; MCS: minimally
conscious state; PVS: persistent vegetative state; UWS: unresponsive
wakefulness syndrome; VS: vegetative state.
Acknowledgements
SL is funded by the Belgian National Funds for Scientific Research. This debate
paper originated from the European Task Force on Disorders of
Consciousness, founded by G. Dolce, 18 September 2009 meeting in Rome at
the Italian Ministry of Health, Work and Welfare, funded by the S. Anna
Institute, Crotone, Italy. The following participants attended the meeting: H.
Binder (Austria), GG Celesia (USA, chairman), F. Cohadon (France), G. Dolce
(Italy; organiser), R. Elefante (Italy), A. Granata (Italy), M. Quintieri (Italy), L. Lucca
(Italy), G. Gigli (Italy), M. Koler (Germany), S. Laureys (Belgium, chairman), J.
Leon-Carrion (Spain), A. Morresi (Italy), G. Pugliesi (Italy), P. Pugliese (Italy), W.G.
Sannita (Italy & USA), L. Sazbon (Israel), E. Schmutzhard (Austria), A. Soddu
(Belgium), K. von Wild (Germany). A selection of the participants, together
with delegates from the United Kingdom (A. Zeman) and the Netherlands (J.
Lavrijsen) participated in the writing of this consensus paper, aiming for a
balanced representation in terms of geography and professional background
(that is, neurology, neurosurgery, intensive care, rehabilitation, chronic and
nursing home care, psychology and neuroscience). All delegates have
previously participated in the development of discipline-specific position
statements on disorders of consciousness or have made substantial
contributions to the peer-reviewed literature.
Author details
1Coma Science Group, Dept of Neurology and Cyclotron Research Centre,
University Hospital and University of Liège, 4000 Liège, and Belgian National
Science Funds, Belgium. 2Dept of Neurology, Loyola University of Chicago,
Stritch School of Medicine, 2160 S. First Avenue, Maywood, IL 60153, USA.
3Neurosurgical University Hospital, Pellegrin Tripode, Bordeaux, France. 4Dept
of Primary and Community Care, Radboud University Nijmegen Medical
Centre Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 5Dept of Experimental Psychology,
University of Seville, Spain; Center for Brain Injury Rehabilitation, Torneo 23,
Seville, Spain. 6Department of Neuroscience, Ophthalmology and Genetics,
University of Genova, Genova, Italy. 7Department of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Science, State University of New York, Stony Brook, NY, USA. 8Tel
Aviv University, Sackler Medical School, or Former Director of ICU for
Vegetative Patients at Loewenstein Rehabilitation Hospital, Israel. 9Dept of
Neurology, University Hospital Innsbruck, Austria. 10Medical Faculty,
Westphälische Wilhelms-University, Münster, Germany. 11Department of
Rheumatology and Rehabilitation, Al-Azhar University, Cairo, Egypt.
12Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology, Peninsula Medical School, Exeter, UK.
13Research on Advanced Neuro-rehabilitation, S. Anna Institute, Via Siris - IT-
88900 Crotone, Italy.
Authors’ contributions
All authors contributed to the content of this manuscript and have read and
approved the final draft.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 20 August 2010 Accepted: 1 November 2010
Published: 1 November 2010
References
1. Monti MM, Laureys S, Owen AM: The vegetative state. BMJ 2010,
341:292-296.
2. Kretschmer E: Das apallische Syndrom. Z ges Neurol Psychiat 1940,
169:576-579.
3. Calvet J, Coll J: Meningitis of sinusoid origin with the form of coma vigil.
Rev Otoneuroophtalmol 1959, 31:443-445.
Laureys et al. BMC Medicine 2010, 8:68
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/8/68
Page 3 of 4
4. Jennett B, Plum F: Persistent vegetative state after brain damage. A
syndrome in search of a name. Lancet 1972, 1:734-737.
5. The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS: Medical aspects of the persistent
vegetative state (1). N Engl J Med 1994, 330:1499-1508.
6. Jennett B: The vegetative state. Medical facts, ethical and legal dilemmas
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2002.
7. Celesia GG: Persistent vegetative state: clinical and ethical issues. Suppl
Clin Neurophysiol 2000, 53:460-462.
8. Shewmon DA: A critical analysis of conceptual domains of the
vegetative state: sorting fact from fancy. NeuroRehabilitation 2004,
19:343-347.
9. Kotchoubey B: Apallic syndrome is not apallic: Is vegetative state
vegetative? Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 2005, 15:333-356.
10. Schoenle PW, Witzke W: How vegetative is the vegetative state?
Preserved semantic processing in VS patients–evidence from N 400
event-related potentials. NeuroRehabilitation 2004, 19:329-334.
11. Jennett B: Thirty years of the vegetative state: clinical, ethical and legal
problems. Prog Brain Res 2005, 150:537-543.
12. Bichat M-F-X: Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort Paris: Brosson
Gabon; 1800.
13. Borthwick C: The proof of the vegetable: a commentary on medical
futility. J Med Ethics 1995, 21:205-208.
14. Velez GJ: Death of John Paul II and the basic human care for the sick
and the dying. Ethics Med 2005, 21:167-177.
15. Laureys S: Permanent vegetative state and persistent vegetative state
are not interchangeable terms. British Medical Journal 2000
[http://bmj.com/cgi/eletters/321/7266/916#10276], 16 Oct 2000
(9 Sept 2005).
16. Lavrijsen JC, van den Bosch JS, Koopmans RT, van Weel C: Prevalence and
characteristics of patients in a vegetative state in Dutch nursing homes.
J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 2005, 76:1420-1424.
17. Giacino JT, Ashwal S, Childs N, Cranford R, Jennett B, Katz DI, Kelly JP,
Rosenberg JH, Whyte J, Zafonte RD, Zasler ND: The minimally conscious
state: Definition and diagnostic criteria. Neurology 2002, 58:349-353.
18. Dolce G, Quintieri M, Serra S, Lagani V, Pignolo L: Clinical signs and early
prognosis in vegetative state: a decisional tree, data-mining study. Brain
Inj 2008, 22:617-623.
19. Dolce G, Sazbon L: The Post-traumatic Vegetative State New York: Thieme;
2002.
20. Childs NL, Mercer WN, Childs HW: Accuracy of diagnosis of persistent
vegetative state. Neurology 1993, 43:1465-1467.
21. Andrews K, Murphy L, Munday R, Littlewood C: Misdiagnosis of the
vegetative state: retrospective study in a rehabilitation unit. BMJ 1996,
313:13-16.
22. Schnakers C, Vanhaudenhuyse A, Giacino J, Ventura M, Boly M, Majerus S,
Moonen G, Laureys S: Diagnostic accuracy of the vegetative and
minimally conscious state: clinical consensus versus standardized
neurobehavioral assessment. BMC Neurol 2009, 9:35.
23. Tavalaro J, Tayson R: Look Up for Yes New York, NY: Kodansha America, Inc;
1997.
24. Voss HU, Uluc AM, Dyke JP, Watts R, Kobylarz EJ, McCandliss BD, Heier LA,
Beattie BJ, Hamacher KA, Vallabhajosula S, Goldsmith SJ, Ballon D,
Giacino JT, Schiff ND: Possible axonal regrowth in late recovery from the
minimally conscious state. J Clin Invest 2006, 116:2005-2011.
25. Owen AM, Coleman MR, Boly M, Davis MH, Laureys S, Pickard JD: Detecting
awareness in the vegetative state. Science 2006, 313:1402.
26. Laureys S, Boly M: The changing spectrum of coma. Nat Clin Pract Neurol
2008, 4:544-546.
27. Monti MM, Vanhaudenhuyse A, Coleman MR, Boly M, Pickard JD,
Tshibanda L, Owen AM, Laureys S: Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in
Disorders of Consciousness. N Engl J Med 2010, 362:579-89.
28. Zeman A: Persistent vegetative state. Lancet 1997, 350:795-799.
29. Machado C, Korein J, Aubert E, Bosch J, Alvarez MA, Rodriguez R, Valdes P,
Portela L, Garcia M, Perez N, Chinchilla M, Machado Y, Machado Y:
Recognizing a mother’s voice in the persistent vegetative state. Clin EEG
Neurosci 2007, 38:124-126.
30. Coleman MR, Rodd JM, Davis MH, Johnsrude IS, Menon DK, Pickard JD,
Owen AM: Do vegetative patients retain aspects of language
comprehension? Evidence from fMRI. Brain 2007, 130:2494-2507.
31. Bekinschtein TA, Shalom DE, Forcato C, Herrera M, Coleman MR, Manes FF,
Sigman M: Classical conditioning in the vegetative and minimally
conscious state. Nat Neurosci 2009, 12:1343-1349.
32. Majerus S, Bruno MA, Schnakers C, Giacino JT, Laureys S: The problem of
aphasia in the assessment of consciousness in brain-damaged patients.
Prog Brain Res 2009, 177:49-61.
33. Bruno M-A, Fernández-Espejo D, Lehembre R, Tshibanda L,
Vanhaudenhuyse A, Gosseries O, Lommers E, Noirhomme Q, Boly M,
Napolitani M, et al: Multi-modal imaging in patients with disorders of
consciousness showing “functional hemispherectomy”. Prog Brain Res
2010.
34. Sazbon L, Groswasser Z: Prolonged coma, vegetative state, post-
comatose unawareness: semantics or better understanding? Brain Inj
1991, 5:1-2.
35. von Wild K, Gerstenbrand F, Dolce G, AS/VS’ Esgo: Guidelines for quality
management of Apallic Syndrome/Vegetative State. Eur J Trauma Surg
2007, 33:268-292.
36. Laureys S, Owen AM, Schiff ND: Brain function in coma, vegetative state,
and related disorders. Lancet Neurol 2004, 3:537-546.
37. Kampfl A, Schmutzhard E, Franz G, Pfausler B, Haring HP, Ulmer H, Felber S,
Golaszewski S, Aichner F: Prediction of recovery from post-traumatic
vegetative state with cerebral magnetic-resonance imaging. Lancet 1998,
351:1763-1767.
38. Eilander HJ, Wijnen VJ, Scheirs JG, de Kort PL, Prevo AJ: Children and
young adults in a prolonged unconscious state due to severe brain
injury: outcome after an early intensive neurorehabilitation programme.
Brain Inj 2005, 19:425-436.
39. Cohadon F, Richer E: Deep cerebral stimulation in patients with post-
traumatic vegetative state. 25 cases. Neurochirurgie 1993, 39:281-292.
40. von Wild KR: Posttraumatic rehabilitation and one year outcome
following acute traumatic brain injury (TBI): data from the well defined
population based German Prospective Study 2000-2002. Acta Neurochir
Suppl 2008, 101:55-60.
41. Pignolo L, Quintieri M, Sannita WG: The Glasgow outcome scale in
vegetative state: a possible source of bias. Brain Inj 2009, 23:1-2.
42. Teasdale G, Jennett B: Assessment of coma and impaired consciousness.
A practical scale. Lancet 1974, 2:81-84.
43. Majerus S, Gill-Thwaites H, Andrews K, Laureys S: Behavioral evaluation of
consciousness in severe brain damage. Prog Brain Res 2005, 150:397-413.
44. Eilander HJ, van de Wiel M, Wijers M, van Heugten CM, Buljevac D,
Lavrijsen JC, Hoenderdaal PL, de Letter-van der Heide L, Wijnen VJ,
Scheirs JG, de Kort PL, Prevo AJ: The reliability and validity of the PALOC-
s: a post-acute level of consciousness scale for assessment of young
patients with prolonged disturbed consciousness after brain injury.
Neuropsychol Rehabil 2009, 19:1-27.
45. Laureys S: Death, unconsciousness and the brain. Nat Rev Neurosci 2005,
6:899-909.
46. Leon-Carrion J, Martin-Rodriguez JF, Damas-Lopez J, Barroso y Martin JM,
Dominguez-Morales MR: Brain function in the minimally conscious state:
a quantitative neurophysiological study. Clin Neurophysiol 2008,
119:1506-1514.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/8/68/prepub
doi:10.1186/1741-7015-8-68
Cite this article as: Laureys et al.: Unresponsive wakefulness syndrome: a
new name for the vegetative state or apallic syndrome. BMC Medicine
2010 8:68.
Laureys et al. BMC Medicine 2010, 8:68
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/8/68
Page 4 of 4
